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ORAL MODIFICATION OF SALES CONTRACTS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS PROBLEM
BETH A. EISLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code' "seeks to protect
and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales
contracts without regard to the technicalities which [at common law]
hamper such adjustments."2 Subsection (1) permits all modifications,
written or oral, to be binding without consideration. Subsection (2) al-
lows the parties to exclude oral modification or rescission of their writ-
ten agreement.3 Subsection (3) requires that the Code Statute of
Frauds be satisfied if the contract as modified is within the provisions
of the Statute. Subsection (4) provides that an attempt at modification
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., 1968, J.D., 1972,
The George Washington University. I am grateful for the excellent research assistance of Ms.
Deborah Brouwer of the class of 1980, Wayne State University Law School
1. Section 2-209 provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to
be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed
writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants
such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the
other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201)
must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract
may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that strict
performance will be requiredof any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust
in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-209. All citations to Code sections and comments, unless otherwise indicated, refer to
the 1972 Official Edition of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Official Comments.
2. Id. Comment 1.
3. "No oral modification" clauses typically read: "This agreement is the entire understand-
ing between the parties, and no modification, alteration or amendment shall be effective unless in
a writing signed by both parties." 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS
§ 4.04(2). This article does not address oral modification of a written sales contract that contains a
no oral modification clause.
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or rescission, which does not satisfy the requirements of subsections (2)
or (3), can operate as a waiver. Subsection (5) permits a party to retract
a waiver made under subsection (4), unless the retraction would be un-
just because of a material change of position by the other party in reli-
ance on the waiver.
Although subsection (3) seems quite simple to comprehend, few
courts or commentators agree on its meaning or effect.4 Assume, for
example, that Buyer and Seller enter into a signed written contract for
the sale of 100 items at $10 per item. Assume further that before deliv-
ery Buyer and Seller orally agree to change the price to $12 per item.
Because the contract as modified is for the sale of goods for $1,200, the
writing requirement of subsection (3) is applicable. What, then, is the
legal effect of the oral modification? Three issues immediately arise.
First, does the original writing satisfy the requirements of subsection
(3) or must the modification itself be written? Second, will compliance
with the non-formal enforcement provisions of the Statute of Frauds
satisfy subsection (3)? Finally, what effect do the waiver provisions of
subsections (4) and (5) have on the enforceability of oral modifications
if a party materially changes its position in reliance on the agreement
as modified?
Because of the confusion concerning the legal effect of oral modifica-
tion of sales contracts that come within the writing requirement of sub-
section (3), section 2-209 has failed to apprise buyers and sellers of the
most efficient manner of conducting their business transactions.
Moreover, the writing requirement in subsection (3) adds a technical-
ity-albeit a necessary one-that hampers modification of sales con-
tracts.' A need still exists, therefore, for simplicity, clarity, and
4. See, e.g., Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1973);
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1-5, at 45 (2d ed. 1980). Seegenerally Note, Oral Modocation ofSales Contracts andthe Statute
of Frauds, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 593 (1972); Note, The Scope and.4feaning ofWaver in Section 2-209
ofthe Unform Commercial Code, 5 GA. L. REV. 783 (1971); 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699 (1974).
5. The purpose of the Code is, inter alia, "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law gov-
erning commercial transactions" and "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2)(a), (c).
6. The drafters intended § 2-209 "to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable
modifications of sales contracts without regard to the [pre-Code] technicalities which hamper such
adjustments," U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment I. Subsection (1) abrogates one common-law technical-
ity-the pre-existing duty rule. 1 N.Y. STATE LAW REVIsION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 642 (1955) (analysis of E. Patterson) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. STUDY].
Briefly stated, the pre-existing duty rule requires that modifications of existing contracts be sup-
[Vol. 58:277
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uniformity in the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code permit-
ting modification of sales contracts by oral agreement.
This article attempts to dispel some of the confusion concerning oral
modification of written sales contracts when the contract as modified
comes within the Statute of Frauds. The basic premise of the article is
that the writing technicality of subsection (3) applies only to modifica-
tions unsupported by consideration. Development of this premise and
comparisons of pre-Code common law with section 2-209 provide an-
swers to the three major issues raised by subsection (3). First, the origi-
nal writing does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (3); instead,
all unsupported modifications7 of contracts within the Statute of
Frauds must be evidenced by an authenticated memorandum. Second,
contrary to present practice, compliance with the non-formal enforce-
ported by consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76A (Tent. Draft Nos. I-
7, 1973) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; 1 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 76
(1932) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
Subsection (2), however, permits parties to a contract to add a "formality (or 'technicality'?)" to
the modification process. I N.Y. STUDY, supra, at 640 (analysis of E. Patterson). The writing
requirement of subsection (3) also adds a technicality to the modification of contracts. Moreover,
subsection (4), as currently interpreted, adds a technicality to what was quite clear and flexible at
common law.
There seems to be a conflict between the text of subsection (1) and the official comment regard-
ing the extent of the Code's abrogation of the pre-existing duty rule. Subsection (1) provides that
an agreement modifying a contract for the sale of goods needs no consideration to be binding, but
the official comment goes further by requiring that modifications meet the test of good faith im-
posed by the Code in § 1-203. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2. See, e.g., Frateli Gardino S.p.A. v.
Caribbean Lumber Co., 587 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1979); United States for Use of Crane Co. v.
Progressive Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1976); Ralston Purina Co. v. McNabb,
381 F. Supp. 181 (D.C. Tenn. 1974); Ruble Forest Prods., Inc. v. Lancer Mobile Homes, Inc., 269
Or. 315, 524 P,2d 1204 (1974). Curiously, § 1-203 imposes an obligation of good faith on the
performance or enforcement of a contract or duty, see 1 N.Y. STUDY, supra, at 310-15 (analysis of
E. Patterson), but not on the formation of the contract. Because modification would come within
the "formation" category more readily than within that of "performance" or "enforcement," com-
ment 2's imposition of an obligation of good faith in the formation of a contract may be substan-
tive rather than a mere restatement of what the Code already requires. If substantive, the good-
faith requirement should have been enacted as part of subsection (1); otherwise, the comment does
not have the force of law. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1084 n.15 (8th Cir.
1969); Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 578, 396 P.2d 186, 188 (1964); R.
SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
LAW 41-43 (2d ed. 1974). Amendent of subsection (1) to include the good-faith obligation or
amendment of § 1-203 to include modification would obviate any problem concerning the sub-
stantive nature of comment 2. Nevertheless, the modification must not be unconscionable.
U.C.C. § 2-302; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 42-49.
7. Unsupported modifications are those agreements which modify existing contracts and
lack consideration.
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ment provisions of the Statute of Frauds should not satisfy the writing
requirement of subsection (3); rather, subsection (3) requires written
evidence of the modification, unless displaced by reliance. Third, the
waiver terminology of subsections (4) and (5) is not only misleading
and unnecessary, but should be replaced by the common-law doctrine
of reliance.
Because not all commentators and courts interpret and apply section
2-209 according to these conclusions, however, this article also pro-
poses a number of amendments to section 2-209.1 Some of the propos-
als amount to only technical refinements of the section, but the primary
proposal is a substantive amendment that would make the writing re-
quirement of subsection (3) inapplicable to merchants' promises unsup-
ported by consideration.
H. THE BASIC PREMISE: THE WRITING REQUIREMENT OF
SUBSECTION (3) APPLIES ONLY TO UNSUPPORTED
MODIFICATIONS
A. Consideration
The justification for the basic premise of this article evolves prima-
rily from the doctrine of consideration.9 The requirement that a prom-
8. I realize, of course, that even the most carefully drafted statute will not always result in
identical decisions in like cases. I attempt merely to provide a unified framework for analysis.
See I N.Y. STUDY, supra note 6, at 40 (introduction by E. Patterson & R. Schlesinger).
9. Consideration is "bargained-for exchange." J. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS,
A REviSION OF GRISMORE ON CONTRACTS 142 (2d ed. 1974). Consideration is also discussed in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at § 75:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained
for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.
(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.
(4) The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other
person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other person.
Although scholars have long debated the role of consideration in modern contract law, I pro-
ceed from the concept of consideration because of my agreement with Professor Patterson that
"the doctrine of consideration seems likely to be with us for a long time to come, and we shall
therefore need to make the best of it." Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 929, 930 (1958). See also P. ATiYAH, CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS: A FUNDAMENTAL
RESTATEMENT (1970); Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures?,
41 COLUM. L. REv. 863 (1941); Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration beAboiishedfrom the
Common Law?, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1225 (1936).
[Vol. 58:277
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ise be supported by consideration or other validation device is now
found in the modem definition of a contract: "A contract is a promise
or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."10
Consideration is the usual substantive basis for the legal enforcement
of a promise; reliance on a promise affords another basis for relief.
Some promises that lack a substantive basis for enforcement also may
be legally enforceable if the form of the promise satisfies a statutory
requirement. In these situations, compliance with the statute provides
the formal basis for enforcement of the promise."
According to Professor Fuller, legal formalities perform three func-
tions: the evidentiary function; the cautionary function; and the chan-
neling function. More precisely, a legal formality provides evidence of
the existence of a contract. It acts as a check against inconsiderate ac-
tion by impressing upon the casual promisor the import of the promise,
thus inducing deliberation. Thirdly, a legal formality "mark[s] or sig-
nalize[s] the enforceable promise."' 2
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at § 1. Similarly, the UCC defines a contract as
"the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and
any other applicable rules of law." U.C.C. § 1-201(11). A "validation device" is that which makes
a promise legally enforceable. J. MURRAY, JR., supra note 9, at 124.
11. I have relied extensively on the writings of Professors Patterson and Fuller for this basic
discussion of consideration and other validation devices. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941); Patterson, supra note 9. Professor Fuller explored two bases for the
enforcement of a promise--the substantive basis and the formal basis. The substantive basis in-
cludes "private autonomy" (which Professor Patterson spoke of as "bargain" and which I prefer to
label "consideration"), reliance, and unjust enrichment. The formal basis usually consists of a
seal or a signed written instrument.
12. Fuller, supra note 11, at 801. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at § 76,
Comment C.
Consideration, to some extent, performs two of the three functions. A promise supported by
consideration cautions the casual promisor that he is required to do something more than just
speak the words of a promise because the promise arose out of a bargain and contemplates a quid
pro quo. Consideration also performs a channeling function in that it distinguishes preliminary
negotiations from an enforceable promise; but unless contained in a signed writing, it cannot
perform an evidentiary function.
This discussion of validation devices points out their shortcomings. Because a casual promisor
may make unsupported promises with impunity, it may seem that courts protect insincere promis-
ors. The rationale for requiring a validation device, however, is not that insincere promisors
should be protected but that unsupported promises should not be given legal effect. Historically,
not all promises can be given legal significance; the line must be drawn somewhere.
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B. Section 2-209
Interpreting section 2-209 in light of this basic premise results in the
following conclusions. Subsection (1) provides for the enforceability of
unsupported modifications of contracts for the sale of goods for less
than $500.13 The legislation itself provides the legal basis for enforce-
ment of the agreement. On the other hand, there must be either a for-
mal or substantive basis to enforce unsupported oral modifications of
contracts for the sale of goods for $500 or more. The writing require-
ment of subsection (3) provides a formal basis for enforcement of the
agreement. If, however, the formal basis for enforcement is lacking,
ie., if the writing requirement of subsection (3) is not satisfied, a mate-
rial change in position in reliance on the modification agreement pro-
vides a substantive basis for enforcement of the agreement under
subsections (4) and (5).
What follows is an attempt to resolve the three issues raised by the
hypothetical fact situation in which the parties to a sales contract at-
tempt to modify the original contract through an unsupported oral
agreement. Discussion of these issues requires substantial comparisons
of the Code and pre-Code common law because the drafters adopted
section 2-209 to change existing law.14 Resolution of these issues pro-
vides the foundation for proof of this article's basic premise-subsec-
tion (3) does not apply to supported oral modification agreements.
13. See note 6 supra. An unsupported modification agreement of a contract for the sale of
goods under $500 does not easily fit into either the substantive or the formal category. The modi-
fication promise, although given in exchange for a pre-existing legal duty, arose in a bargaining
context. The modification, therefore, at best has a "semi-substantive" basis for enforcement. The
enforceability of this kind of agreement rests primarily on a policy decision of the Code's drafters
that necessary and desirable modifications of existing sales contracts should be legally enforcea-
ble. Even though not supported by consideration, the modification should be enforceable if the
sales contract is unimportant.
In some respects, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts goes further than § 2-209. Section
89D(a) provides for the enforcement of all unsupported oral modifications that are fair and equi-
table in view of unanticipated circumstances. The Statute of Frauds is applicable to these modifi-
cation agreements through § 223, but § 223 does not require that all unsupported modifications of
contracts within the Statute be written. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at §§ 89D,
223.
14. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
[Vol. 58:277
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III. PRE-CODE AND NON-CODE COMMON LAW---ORAL
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS UNDER THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS
A. In General
After the enactment of the English Statute of Frauds, 5 certain
classes of contracts were unenforceable unless the agreement was evi-
denced by a written memorandum signed by the party against whom
enforcement of the contract was sought.' 6 In the United States, some
form of the Statute of Frauds has been enacted in virtually every
state. "
The Statute requires that the memorandum state with reasonable
certainty and accuracy (1) each party to the contract, (2) the subject
matter to which the contract relates, and (3) the terms and conditions of
all promises constituting the contract and by whom and to whom the
promises are made. 8 Only material terms, however, need be in-
15. "An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries," 29 Charles II, c.3 (1677). See 3 S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 450 (3d ed. 1960).
16. See general/y 2 A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT
LAW § 275 (1950); 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 448-450 (3d ed.
1960). "'The principle design of the statute of frauds was,' as Lord Ellenborough remarks, in Cuff
v. Penn, 1 Mau. & Sel. 26, 'that parties should not have imposed on them burdensome contracts
which they never made, and be fixed with goods which they never contemplated to purchase."'
Cummings v. Arnold, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 486, 490-91 (1842).
17. Thirty-six jurisdictions adopted the Uniform Sales Act. Section 4 of the Act provided:
(1) A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five
hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall
accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or
unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the
party to be charged or his agent in that behalf.
(2) The provisions of this section apply to every such contract or sale, notwithstand-
ing that the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time or may not at the
time of such contract or sale be actually made, procured, or provided, or fit or ready for
delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering
the same fit for delivery; but if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller especially
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business, the provisions of this section shall not apply.
(3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the
buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, expresses by words or conduct his
assent to becoming the owner of those specific goods.
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 4 (superceded by U.C.C. § 2-201).
18. 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 207.
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cluded.' 9 Several writings may constitute a sufficient memorandum.2 0
Contracts for the sale of goods over a certain dollar amount may
satisfy the Statute by methods other than by written memorandum, in-
cluding (1) acceptance and receipt, (2) part payment, or (3) earnest pay-
ment.2'
Generally, a written contract within the Statute may be effectively
rescinded by an oral rescission agreement when the agreement is sup-
ported by consideration.22 Any written contract may be effectively
modified by an oral modification agreement if the new contract is not
within the Statute. 23 If, however, the new contract falls within the Stat-
19. Although the Uniform Sales Act did not specify what the writing must contain, § 4(l)
had been judicially construed to require all material terms to be in writing. See, e.g., Ginsberg
Mach. Co. v. J & H Label Processing Corp., 341 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1965); Lauter v. W & J Sloane,
Inc., 417 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 1 N.Y. STUDY, supra note 6, at 368 & n.29 (analysis of J.
Honnold). See also 1 N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF
HEARING ON ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 163-64 (1954) (testimony of K.
Llewellyn).
20. 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 208.
21. Section 17 of the original Statute provided:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the said four
and twentieth day of June no contract for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandises,
for the price of £10 sterling, or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer
shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in
earnest to bind the bargain, or in part of payment, or that some note or memorandum in
writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such
contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
29 Charles II, c.3 (1677). Acceptance is an act of assent by the buyer, either by words or conduct,
to become the owner of those goods which are the subject matter of the contract. Assent to the
contract may be acceptance under the Statute. Receipt, on the other hand, usually denotes a
change in possession of the goods from the seller to the buyer. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at
§§ 482-493; 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at §§ 201-202.
Many courts and the Restatement treat part payment and earnest payment as identical concepts.
Professor Corbin, however, persuasively argues that § 17 of the original Statute treated them as
separate and distinct concepts. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at § 494; 1 RESTATEMENT, supra
note 6, at §§ 199(b), 205. Payment may be in money, negotiable instrument, property, services, or
cancellation of an existing claim or debt. Id. § 205.
22. The reason for the general rule that rescission agreements need not be written is that the
Statute applies only to the making of contracts, not to their rescission. It is important to note,
however, that if the rescission includes a transfer or retransfer of property that falls within the
Statute, the rescission agreement must satisfy the requirements of the Statute. See 2 A. CORBIN,
supra note 16, at § 302; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 592; 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at
§ 222.
23. 2 A. CORBIN, upra note 16, at § 304; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 591. It is
helpful at this point to clarify terminology. When the parties to a contract modify an existing
contract, their modification agreement rescinds the original contract and creates a new contract
consisting of the terms of the original contract, which the parties have not changed, plus the new
terms contained in the modification agreement. 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 223(1). Con-
ceptually, there are two contracts, the original and the new contract, but only one is legally en-
forceable. The new contract is considered a substitute for the original one and, consequently, ishttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/3
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ute, the general rule is that the modification agreement must be written
or otherwise satisfy the requirements of the Statute to modify effec-
tively the original contract.' This rule warrants further analysis, be-
cause not all modifications of contracts within the Statute must be
written; only those agreements which modify essential terms must be
written.
At the outset, the extent of the modification does not change the gen-
eral rule that a modification agreement must satisfy the Statute if the
new contract is within the Statute." A modification of a contract
within the Statute, which changes the time of delivery from noon to
enforceable if it satisfies the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. If, however, the new contract
does not satisfy the Statute and there has been no change of position in reliance on the new
contract, the original contract is neither modified nor rescinded and is enforceable if it was other-
wise enforceable. Id. § 223(2). The justification for this result is that the parties' manifestation of
an intent to contract, absent a contrary intent to rescind their original agreement, should leave the
parties with an enforceable contract.
Professor Patterson discussed the concept of "modification" in his analysis of § 2-209 for the
New York Law Revision Commission:
Strictly speaking, no one, not even the parties to a contract, can "modify" the terms of a
contract already made, any more than one can "modify" the day on which George
Washington was actually born. Any so-called "modification" of a contract involves ana-
lytically two steps: (a) The termination by agreement of all obligations under the (first)
contract; (b) the making of a (second) contract containing some of the terms of the first
contract and some different terms.
I N.Y. STUDY, supra note 6, at 643 (analysis of E. Patterson). As used in this article, a "modifica-
tion" occurs through a two-step process of rescission of the original contract and formation of a
new contract.
24. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at § 305; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 593. Abell
v. Munson, 18 Mich. 306, 100 Am. Dec. 165 (1869), enunciates the early common-law rule: "The
[Statute of Frauds] prohibits any enforcement of parol contracts; and while written contracts,
which would have been lawful if unwritten, may be modified by parol, subsequently, in many
cases, yet this cannot be done where the law requires the agreement to be in writing." .d. at 312,
100 Am. Dec. at 167.
Justice Cardozo, while on the Court of Appeals of New York, succinctly stated these general
principles in his concurring opinion in Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263
(1920):
I think it is the law that where contracts are subject to the statute, changes are governed
by the same requirements of form as original provisions. Abrogated by word of mouth
such a contract may be, but its obligations may not be varied by spoken words of prom-
ise while it continues undissolved. . . . Oral promises are ineffective to make the con-
tract, or any part of it, in the beginning. Oral promises must also be ineffective to vary it
thereafter.
Id. at 454, 127 N.E. at 265 (citations omitted) (Cardozo, J., concurring). In Imperator Realty the
parties orally agreed to a change in performance of a written contract to exchange property. De-
fendant refused to convey because of plaintiff's failure to perform according to the original con-
tract. The court reinstated the trial court judgment for plaintiff on the theory of waiver and
estoppel.
25. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 594. Justice Cardozo, in Imperator Realty, stated: "I
think it is inadequate to say that oral changes are effective if they are slight, and ineffective if they
are important. . . . 'Every part of the contract, in regard to which the parties are stipulating,Washington University Open Scholarship
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1:00 p.m., for example, must satisfy the Statute just as would a modifi-
cation from June 1 to July 1.26 Both changes must satisfy the Statute
not because all modifications must be written or because the modifica-
tions are material, but because the delivery term is an essential term of
the contract and the memorandum must contain all essential terms of
the contract to satisfy the Statute. It follows, then, that a change in the
delivery term, no matter how slight, is effective only when it is evi-
denced by a writing or it otherwise satisfies the Statute.27
Likewise, if the modification agreement changes a nonessential term
in the original contract, it need not satisfy the Statute because the origi-
nal written contract satisfies the Statute. In this case, the new contract
consists of the original written contract plus the oral modification
agreement, both of which, viewed as a whole, satisfy the Statute. This
case is rare, though, because courts considered very few terms in a pre-
Code or non-Code contract to be nonessential.2 8
Thus, the requirement that modifications be written is grounded in
the requirement that the memorandum accurately contain all essential
terms of the contract, rather than in a per se rule that all modifications
be written.
B. Contracts for the Sale of Goods
A matter that frequently arose in pre-Code cases was the effect, if
any, of an oral agreement modifying an essential term of a written sales
must be taken to be material'...." 228 N.Y. at 455, 127 N.E. at 265 (Cardozo, J., concurring)
(quoting Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M & W 109, 117, 151 Eng. Rep. 342, 345 (1840)).
26. An illustration from the Restatement provides another example: S promises to sell and B
promises to buy a specific automobile for $1,000. The written contract provides that delivery shall
be in 30 days and payment in 60 days. Before the expiration of 30 days, S and B orally agree that
the automobile shall be delivered in 45 days and that payment shall be made in 90 days from the
time of the original bargain. According to the Restatement, the new contract as modified is unen-
forceable and does not affect the duties o-S and B under the original contract. The new contract
is unenforceable because the modification agreement is not in writing. 1 RESTATEMENT, supra
note 6, at § 223, Illustration 2. See also Van Iderstine Co. v. Barnet Leather Co., 242 N.Y. 425,
152 N.E. 250 (1926).
27. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at § 304. This analysis comports with Justice Cardozo's
statement in Imrperator Realy that "changes-are governed by the same requirements of form as
original provisions." 228 N.Y. at 454, 127 N.E. at 265 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
28. Professor Corbin cited Kohoot v. Gurbisz, 101 N.J. Eq. 757, 139 A. 223 (1927), for the
proposition that an oral agreement to change the consideration is effective when the Statute ex-
pressly provides that the consideration need not be contained in the memorandum. 2 A. CORBIN,
supra note 16, at § 304.
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contract when the new contract came within the Statute.29 It is clear
that if the modification was oral, it would not satisfy the memorandum
requirement of the Statute. The agreement, however, might satisfy one
of the Statute's alternative requirements.3" If there had been part or
earnest payment 3' or acceptance and receipt of part or all of the
goods32 under the new contract as modified, the oral agreement would
be enforceable.33
It is possible that the oral agreement would have had some effect
even had the requirements of the Statute not been satisfied. If one of
the parties to the original agreement could have and would have per-
formed but the other party through the oral agreement prevented that
performance, the original contract was not modified; however, neither
would the other party have breached the original contract.34
For purposes of illustration, assume that Buyer and Seller negotiated
a written contract for the sale of 100 grade B items at $10 per item to be
delivered on June 1. Assume also that Buyer and Seller orally agreed
to change the items to be delivered to 100 grade A items at $12 per
item. The new contract, which is still within the Statute because it is
for the sale of goods for $1,200, does not satisfy the Statute because the
29. See, e.g., Willis v. Fields, 132 Ga. 242, 63 S.E. 828 (1908); Grand Forks Lumber Co. v.
McClure Logging Co., 103 Minn. 471, 115 N.W. 406 (1908); Warren v. A. B. Mayer Mfg. Co., 161
Mo. 112, 61 S.W. 644 (1901).
30. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
31. See H.W. Paine & Co. v. Manistee Tanning Co., 279 F. 340 (6th Cir. 1922); Ryan v.
Gilbert, 320 Mass. 682, 71 N.E.2d 219 (1947); Packard v. Steward, 34 Vt. 126 (1861).
32. See Kribs v. Jones, 44 Md. 396 (1875); McDonald v. Union Hay Co., 143 Minn. 40, 172
N,W. 891 (1919); Adams v. Thayer, 85 N.H. 177, 155 A. 687 (1931); Producers Coke Co. v. Hoo-
ver, 268 Pa. 104, 110 A. 733 (1920); Sedro Venner Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 P. 1100 (1911).
33. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at § 305; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 598. Professor
Williston points out that the alternative means by which the Statute is satisfied must occur after
the oral modification agreement has been made.
34. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at §§ 310-311; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 595; see
Lampasona v. Capriotti, 296 Mass. 34, 4 N.E.2d 621 (1936); Bank of United States v. Manheim,
264 N.Y. 45, 189 N.E. 776 (1934).
"He who prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself of the non-perform-
ance which he has, himself, occasioned, for the law says to him, in effect; 'This is your
own act, and, therefore, you are not damnified'..... Sometimes the resulting disabil-
ity has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver.... The truth is that
we are facing a principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, one with
roots in the yet larger principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon
his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong .... The Statute of Frauds was
not intended to offer an asylum of escape from that fundamental principle of justice.
Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. at 457, 127 N.E. at 266 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (quoting
Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N.Y. 489, 491, 44 N.E. 167, 167 (1896)) (citations omitted).
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original writing did not accurately reflect the new terms of the agree-
ment. If Seller could have delivered 100 grade B items on June 1, but
instead delivered 100 grade A items because of the oral agreement,
Seller's failure to perform under the original contract is not a breach.35
Thus, Buyer could not refuse to pay for the items delivered under the
contract on the ground that delivery of 100 grade B items was a condi-
tion precedent to his duty to pay. Buyer also would have no right to
damages because of Seller's failure to deliver the grade B items under
the original contract.
The result would be the same had the oral agreement not been sup-
ported by consideration.36  Assume that instead of exchanging the
quality for the price the parties orally agreed to change the delivery
date from June 1 to July 1. The oral agreement would be unenforce-
able on two grounds: first, the oral agreement violates the accuracy
requirement of the Statute; and second, the agreement violates the pre-
existing duty rule in that Buyer's promise to accept the goods one
month later than agreed upon in the original contract is not supported
by consideration. As in the previous hypothetical, Seller would be ex-
cused from performing as required under the original contract if he
could have performed but did not in reliance on the oral agreement.
Thus, if Seller delivered on July 1, Seller would be excused for the
delay if he could have delivered on June 1, but did not do so because of
the oral agreement.
Because the oral agreement does not satisfy the Statute, either party
could have repudiated the modification upon notice before the other
party substantially changed his position in reliance on the agreement.
In terms of the previous hypothetical, Buyer could have insisted before
35. Buyer's failure to perform may have been only temporary or may have been permanent.
In either case, the failure to deliver the grade B items is not actionable because the oral agreement
prevented Buyer's performance. Buyer's reliance on the oral agreement, however, merely excused
its failure to perform; its reliance did not create a new contract.
36. See 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 595 (citing Scheerschmidt v. Smith, 74 Minn. 224,
77 N.W. 34 (1898)). See also Reinky v. Findley Elec., 147 Minn. 161, 180 N.W. 236 (1920);
Nelson v. Glasoe, 231 N.W.2d 766 (N.D. 1975); Neppach v. Oregon & C. R.R., 46 Or. 374, 80 P.
482 (1905).
37. 2 A. CoRBIN, supra note 16, at § 310; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 595. See also I
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 224.
"The contract, therefore, stood unchanged. The defendant might have retracted his oral prom-
ise an hour after making it, [or within a reasonable time thereafter] and the plaintiff would have
been helpless." Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. at 456, 127 N.E. at 266 (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
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June 1 on delivery of the grade B items if Seller had not substantially
changed his position so that he no longer would have been able to de-
liver the grade B items.3" In the latter hypothetical, Buyer also could
have insisted on the original June 1 delivery date before Seller substan-
tially changed his position. Thus, only a material change of position in
reliance on an oral modification gave legal effect to an otherwise unen-
forceable modification.39
IV. SECTION 2-201: THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE4 °
Section 2-201 follows the general outline of section 17 of the original
38. The issue of which party could repudiate the oral agreement seems not to have been the
subject of dispute in any reported case. Professor Williston determined that it was the party "who
requested delay or prevented performance when due" who could withdraw the request or cease
prevention. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 595. Professor Corbin spoke of the party who
caused and requested the delay as the one who repudiates the oral agreement. 2 A. CORBIN, supra
note 16, at § 311. Professor Corbin did not expressly deny the other party the right to repudiate.
Illustration 2 of the Restatement describes the party assenting to a request for delay as withdraw-
ing his oral assent. I RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 224, Illustration 2. In addition, Justice
Cardozo, in Imperator Realty, described the English principle as permitting either party to change
his mind before oral consent is acted on. 228 N.Y. at 458, 127 N.E. at 266 (Cardozo, J., concur-
ring).
39. The principle that the party prevented from performing is not in breach of contract be-
cause of reliance on the oral agreement applies even if that party is the same party who requested
the modification. 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at §§ 310-311. Thus in the hypothetical, Seller
would not be in breach even if Seller requested the modification.
40. Section 2-201 provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term
agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason
to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given wthin 10 days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the
seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
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English Statute of Frauds.41 Like the original Statute, section 2-201
denies enforcement to contracts for the sale of goods above a certain
dollar amount unless the parties satisfy the requirements of the sec-
tion.42 Similarly, the purpose of section 2-201 is primarily eviden-
tiary.-"to indicate that a contract for sale has been made. 43
Under the Code the Statute of Frauds is satisfied either by a writing
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought44 or, as be-
tween merchants, by receipt of a confirmation to which the receiving
party does not object.45 In addition, otherwise valid contracts that do
not satisfy either requirement may be enforceable in three situations:
(1) special manufacture;46 (2) admission;4' and (3) payment and accept-
ance of the price or receipt and acceptance of the goods. 8
Conformity with the writing requirement mandates that the writing
merely indicate that a sales contract has been made between the parties
and that the contract be signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought.49 Contrary to pre-Code common law, the writing "need not
contain all the [essential] terms of the contract. . . . All that is re-
quired is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered
oral evidence rests on a real transaction."50 In addition, the contract is
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is
not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or
which have been received and accepted (Sec.2-606).
U.C.C. § 2-201. A contract valid in other repects must be proved; the writing is merely evidence
of that contract.
41. Section 17 is reproduced in note 21 supra.
42. The Code's Statute of Frauds applies to "a contract for the sale of goods for the price of
$500 or more." U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
43. Port City Constr. Co. v. Henderson, 48 Ala. App. 639, 266 So. 2d 896 (1972); see J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 61.
44. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
45. Id. § 2-201(2).
46. Id. § 2-201(3)(a).
47. Id. § 2-201(3)(b).
48. Id. § 2-201(3)(c).
49. The words "has been made" may mean that a written offer or a preliminary writing
would not satisfy the Statute regarding a subsequent contract. Alice v. Robett Mfg., 328 F. Supp.
1377 (D. Ga. 1970), af§'d, 445 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1971); Nations Enterprises v. Process Equip., 579
P.2d 655 (Colo. 1978); 1 N.Y. STUDY, supra note 6, at 369 (analysis of J. Honnold). Contra,
Southwest Eng'r v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 475 P.2d 18 (1970); Veik v. Tilden Bank,
200 Neb. 705, 265 N.W.2d 214 (1978); GTP Leisure Prods. v. B-W Footwear, 55 A.D.2d 1009, 391
N.Y.S.2d 489 (1977); Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 536 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1976). See R.
NOa STROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 24 n.13 (1970).
50. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1. In its entirety, this comment provides:
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enforceable even if the writing incorrectly states the terms.5' The only
term that must be specified is quantity,52 and even it need not be stated
accurately 5 3  As at common law, the writing may consist of several
pieces of paper.54
If the contract is between merchants, the Statute also may be satisfied
without a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought. In this situation, the potential plaintiff sends a signed, written
confirmation, which satisfies the requirements of the Statute against the
plaintiff. If the potential defendant receives the confirmation and has
reason to know of its contents and does not give written notice of objec-
tion to its contents within ten days after its receipt, the confirmation
The required writing need not contain all the material terms of the contract and such
material terms as are stated need not be precisely stated. All that is required is that the
writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transac-
tion. It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch pad. It need not indicate which party
is the buyer and which the seller. The only term which must appear is the quantity term
which need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated. The
price, time and place of payment or delivery, the general quality of the goods, or any
particular warranties may all be ommitted.
Special emphasis must be placed on the permissibility of omitting the price term in
view of the insistence of some courts on the express inclusion of this term even where the
parties have contracted on the basis of a published price list. In many valid contracts for
sale the parties do not mention the price in express terms, the buyer being bound to pay
and the seller to accept a reasonable price which the trier of the fact may well be trusted
to determine. Again, frequently the price is not mentioned since the parties have based
their agreement on a price list or catalogue known to both of them and this list serves as
an efficient safeguard against perjury. Finally, "market" prices and valuations that are
current in the vicinity constitute a similar check. Thus if the price is not stated in the
memorandum it can normally be supplied without danger of fraud. Of course if the
"price" consists of goods rather than money the quantity of goods must be stated.
Only three definite and invariable requirements as to the memorandum are made by
this subsection. First, it must evidence a contract for the sale of goods; second, it must be
"signed", a word which includes any authentication which identifies the party to be
charged; and third, it must specify a quantity.
Id.
51. Id. § 2-201(1) & Comment 1.
52. Comment 1 specifies that the "only term which must appear is the quantity term." This
statement, however, may not be a correct interpretation of the Statute. Section 2-201(1) provides
that a writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term, but that the contract is
not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods shown in the writing. This provision may mean that
if, and only if, a quantity term is stated in the writing, then that term controls; contrary to the rule
for other terms, the stated quantity term controls the maximum quantity even if the stated quanti-
ty is not the term agreed upon by the parties. If, on the other hand, the writing does not contain a
quantity term, oral evidence may prove the quantity agreed upon by the parties. See J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at § 2-4 & n.52.
53. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) & Comment 1.
54. See, eg., Alaska Independent Fishermen's Marketing Ass'n v. New England Fish Co., 15
Wash. App. 154, 548 P.2d 348 (1976).
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satisfies the requirements of the Statute against the potential defend-
ant.
55
Additionally, although a contract does not satisfy the writing re-
quirement of the Statute, it is enforceable in three situations.56 First, if
the contract is for the sale of goods to be specially manufactured by a
seller and the goods are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary
course of the seller's business, the contract is enforceable if the seller
has either substantially begun the manufacture of or made commit-
ments for procurement of the goods.5 7 Second, the contract is enforcea-
ble if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits that a
contract for sale was made.5 8 Third, the contract is enforceable to the
extent of the parties' conduct, either when the buyer pays and the seller
accepts payment for the goods or when the buyer receives and accepts
the goods. 59
If the contract is unenforceable under the Statute, reliance may con-
stitute an alternative means of enforcement. 61 In Warder & Lee Eleva-
55. U.C.C. § 2-201(2). This means of satisfying the Statute may create a "Catch-22" situa-
tion for the defendant if written notice of objection and its confirmation satisfy the requirements
of subsection (1). If Buyer, for example, sends a confirmation to Seller and Seller sends back a
signed objection, which admits the making of a contract but objects to the terms in the confirma-
tion, an enforceable contract may be found under subsection (1).
56. The distinction between satisfaction of the Statute and enforcement of the contract is
critical in light of the terminology of § 2-209(3). See text accompanying notes 63-85 infra.
57. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a). See, e.g., Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, 436 F. Supp. 409 (D.
Ohio 1976); LTV Aerospace Corp. v. Bateman, 492 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). Enforce-
ment in this situation is for the benefit of the seller because the seller relied on the oral agreement.
This provision, however, specifically does not preclude enforcement of the contract against the
seller, although the reliance basis for enforcement of the contract is absent when enforcement is
sought against the seller.
58. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b). See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Majestic Marine, 35 Mich. App. 403,
192 N.W.2d 507 (1971). According to Comment 7 of§ 2-201, it is no longer possible for defendant
to admit the contract, plead the statute as a defense, and receive judgment because the Statute was
not satisified. See, e.g., Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977).
59. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c). See, e.g., Clifton Cattle Co. v. Thompson, 43 Cal. App. 3d 11, 117
Cal. Rptr. 500 (1974) (receipt and acceptance); Lockwood v. Smigel, 18 Cal. App. 3d 800, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 289 (1971) (partial payment). This provision is contrary to pre-Code common law in that
the entire contract at common law was enforceable because of the parties' conduct. Under the
Code, the contract is enforceable only to the extent of that conduct. See, e.g., In re Augustin Bros.
Co., 460 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1972).
60. See Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976); Sacred Heart
Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 232 N.W.2d 921 (1975); Jamestown Terminal
Elevator v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976). But see Farmland Serv. Coop. v. Klein, 196 Neb.
538, 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
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tor, Inc. v. Britten,6 the Iowa Supreme Court held the doctrine of
promissory estoppel applicable to section 2-201 through section 1-
103.62 In that case, the buyer resold grain that the seller had orally
promised to sell to the buyer. The buyer's detrimental reliance on the
seller's oral promise persuaded the court to affirm the trial court's judg-
ment enforcing the oral sales agreement in spite of the specific require-
ments of section 2-201.
V. MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS UNDER SECTION 2-
209(3)-AGREEMENTS NOT SUPPORTED BY
CONSIDERATION
A. The Writing Requirement
Under section 2-209(3), the Statute of Frauds for Article 2 (section 2-
201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified comes within the pro-
visions of section 2-201.63 The drafters intended subsection (3) "to pro-
tect against false allegations of oral modifications."'6 To this end, the
official comment to section 2-209(3) states that the Statute of Frauds
provisions of Article 2 apply expressly to modification agreements. Be-
cause of subsection (3), "'[m]odification' for the future cannot be con-
jured up by oral testimony if the price involved is $500.00 or more since
such modification must be shown at least by an authenticated
memo." 65 Consistent with the policy of the Statute of Frauds, subsec-
tion (3) affords no protection to parties modifying contracts of less than
$500.66
A literal reading of subsection (3) produces a result different from
that enunciated in the official comment. The words of the provision
demand only that the modified contract satisfy the Statute. The com-
ment, however, requires that the modification itself be written.
61. 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979).
62. Section 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to con-
tract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bank-
ruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103.
63. Section 2-209(3) provides: "The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Arti-
cle (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions." Id. § 2-
209(3). The text of § 2-201 is reproduced in note 40 supra.
64. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 3.
65. Id. As at common law, the $500 price refers to the new contract, not to the price in the
modification agreement. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
66. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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A hypothetical illustrates the difference between a literal interpreta-
tion of subsection (3) and that of the official comment. Assume that
Buyer and Seller enter into a written contract, signed by both parties, in
which Buyer agrees to buy 100 items at $10 per item and Seller agrees
to deliver the 100 items on June 1. The original contract comes within
and satisfies section 2-201(1). Assume also that before June 1 Buyer
and Seller orally agree to a good faith price change to $12 per item. 7
The oral agreement is not supported by consideration, but is enforcea-
ble under subsection (1). The modified contract, however, comes
within the Statute and thus triggers subsection (3).
A literal interpretation of subsection (3) results in enforcement of the
modification. If only the contract as modified must satisfy the Statute,
then the original written contract satisfies the writing requirements of
section 2-201(1) for both the original contract and the contract as modi-
fied. It matters not that the price term in the writing is incorrect or does
not reflect the modification agreement.68 The Statute is satisfied and
the modification and the contract as modified are enforceable. 9 Anal-
67. For a discussion of the requirement that the modification be made in good faith, see note
6 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
69. Professors White and Summers have acknowledged a similar analysis, but only one of
them concurs. See J. WHrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 45.
It might be argued that even under a literal interpretation of subsection (3), the original writing
does not satisfy the writing requirement of the Statute for the contract as modified. The new
contract consists of the original written contract plus the modification agreement. Section 2-201(1)
requires that there be "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties." The original writing, although evidencing the existence of the original con-
tract, does not indicate that a new contract "has been made." The original writing, therefore, does
not satisfy the Statute's writing requirement for the new contract, le., the contract as modified.
See note 49 supra.
A simple hypothetical, however, refutes this argument. Assume that Buyer sends Seller a signed
written offer to buy 100 items at $10 per item. Assume that Seller, in turn, sends Buyer a signed
acceptance of the offer, but expressly conditions acceptance on Buyer's assent to a price of $10.50.
Buyer then telephones his assent. A contract for 100 items at $10.50 per item results, and the two
writings satisfy the Statute. See U.C.C. § 2-207; notes 49, 54 su ra. In a breach of contract action
based on this hypothetical, the party alleging the contract would have the burden of proving
Buyer's oral assent. From Buyer's perspective of the contract, the result would be the same if
instead of sending a written acceptance, Seller telephones Buyer that he will accept Buyer's offer
only if Buyer agrees to a $10.50 price. Thus, in this hypothetical (wholly oral acceptance or
counter-offer), the party alleging the contract would have the burden of proving both Seller's oral
communication and Buyer's assent. In the hypothetical in the text (wholly oral modification),
however, the party alleging the modification, most likely Seller, would have the burden of proving
the oral modification agreement.
There is no reason why all three situations should not be treated in the same manner, because
the writings in each situation were made before the formation of the contract. The problem arises
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ysis under the official comment, however, yields a contrary result. The
modification is not enforceable because the modification itself is not
shown by "an authenticated memo."7 This analysis accords with judi-
cial interpretation of subsection (3).71
The legislative history of subsection (3) sheds little light on the in-
tended meaning of the provision.72 Professor Patterson, in his analysis
of section 2-209 for the New York Law Revision Commission, found
that subsection (3) merely codified the pre-Code common law's con-
struction of the Statute of Frauds "to apply to agreements modifying
any written agreement which is within the Statute."73 An analysis of
the cases cited by Professor Patterson leads to the conclusion that at
common law the modification agreement was required to satisfy the
Statute to the same extent as the original contract.74 If a term had to be
written in the original, a modification of that term must also be evi-
denced by a writing.75 In most situations, therefore, the modification
agreement needed to be written to be enforceable.76 As previously
stated, however, the common-law writing requirement was grounded in
the accuracy requirements of the Statute, not in a per se rule that all
modifications must be written.77
not with the literal interpretation of subsection (3) of § 2-209, but with an interpretation of the
words "has been made" in § 2-201(1).
70. Authentication in this regard requires that the memorandum be signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought.
71. See, e.g., Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Co., 576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) (change
in warranty); Double-E Sportswear Co. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1973) (elimi-
nation of option to cancel); Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., - Minn. -, 265 N.W.
2d 655 (1978); Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 552 P.2d 63 (1976) (change in
date of delivery); Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977) (change in payment provi-
sion).
72. An attempt to find a legislative "intent" may prove to be fruitless or beyond the "intent"
of the drafters. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870-84 (1930). But see
Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L. REv.
597, 601-02 (1966).
73. 1 N.Y. STUDY, supra note 6, at 643.
74. See, e.g., Hill v. Blake, 97 N.Y. 216 (1884); Davison Coal Co. v. Weston, Dodson & Co.,
209 A.D. 514, 205 N.Y.S. 49 (1924), af§'d, 240 N.Y. 705, 148 N.E. 767 (1925).
75. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra. The requirements of a memorandum under
§ 207 of the Restatement (Second) are less rigorous than those under the Restatement. The Re-
statement (Second) requires that the essential terms of only the unperformed promises be stated
with reasonable certainty, but the Restatement mandates that the terms and conditions of all
promises be stated with reasonable certainty and accuracy.
76. Acceptance and receipt, earnest payment, or part payment subsequent to the modification
agreement also would have satisfied the Statute. See notes 31-32 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 15-28 supra.
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If the common law approach to modification agreements were used
to interpret section 2-209(3), the entire contract as modified would have
to satisfy the Statute. The original writing, therefore, would satisfy the
Statute, and the price change need not be evidenced by a writing, be-
cause section 2-201 requires only a writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made. This approach conforms to the word-
ing of subsection (3), but not to the official comment.
The analysis thus comes full circle. Read literally, the language of
subsection (3) requires that the contract as modified satisfy the Statute.
Accordingly, the original writing would satisfy the Statute.78 Comment
3, however, mandates that the modification agreement itself satisfy the
Statute. Consequently, the modification would have to be written.
Futhermore, common-law analysis leads to anomalous results. Under
the common law, modifications of essential terms must be written accu-
rately. Thus, if subsection (3) follows the common law, as Professor
Patterson stated, then modifications under section 2-209(3) would have
to be written because almost all terms are essential. Common-law
analysis of the Statute of Frauds of section 2-201, however, would grant
legal effect to oral modifications because the only term that must be
written under section 2-201 is the quantity term. Thus, comment 3,
which requires modification agreements to be written, yields the same
result as at common law, but a literal interpretation of subsection (3)
uses a common-law analysis to grant enforcement of oral modifica-
tions.
This analysis leads to the following conclusion: subsection (3) re-
quires modification agreements to be written. In accordance with com-
ment 3, this interpretation best effects the purpose of section 2-209(3):
"to protect against false allegations of oral modifications." An authen-
ticated memo, that is, a memo signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought, is evidence of the modification agreement and
affords the best protection against false allegations of oral modifica-
tions. This interpretation also renders section 2-209(3) available as an
78. If the original contract were oral, of course, there would be no original writing to satisfy
the Statute. In that case the parties would have to satisfy the Statute in their new contract. If, for
example, the original oral contract were for the sale of goods for $400, a good faith price change to
$500 would bring the new contract within the Statute. The parties, therefore, would have to make
a signed writing containing a quantity term to satisfy the Statute. Moreover, if the original oral
contract had been within the Statute (assume a price of $500), special manufacture under § 2-
201(3)(a) would make the original contract enforceable. Special manufacture before the modifica-
tion would not make the new contract enforceable. See note 33 supra.
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alternative basis for enforcement of modification agreements. In cases
in which a substantive basis for the enforcement of a modification
agreement is lacking, such as in agreements unsupported by considera-
tion, there must be a formal basis for enforcement of the agreement.
An authenticated memo provides that basis.79
The writing requirement also performs the three functions of a legal
formality. A memorandum clearly satisfies the evidentiary function of
the formality80 and protects against false allegations of modification.
To a lesser extent, the memo also satisfies the cautionary function of
the formality because the promisor is put on notice that the promise
contained in the memo is not simply a casual promise but is legally
enforceable. If a promisor must take the time to reduce his promise to
a signed writing, then it is unlikely that the written promise will be
made casually or taken lightly. In most situations the writing also ful-
fills the channeling function of the formality by manifesting the prom-
isor's intent that the promise be legally enforceable. 81
In addition to effecting the purpose of section 2-209(3) and perform-
ing the three functions of a legal formality, this conclusion is consistent
with judicial analyses of the problem. Those courts which have consid-
ered the issue have interpreted subsection (3) to require written modifi-
cation agreements.82 In Asco Mining Co. Inc. v. Gross Contracting
79. A material change of position in reliance on a modification agreement also would create
a legally enforceable modification, but the drafters of the Code made a policy decision that a
writing is a better substitute for consideration because of its evidentiary and cautionary functions,
which would better warn the casual promisor than would reliance. Reliance makes the agreement
legally enforceable when the agreement is unsupported by consideration and is not evidenced by
an authenticated memorandum. U.C.C. §§ 2-209(4), (5).
80. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
81. Id. It might be argued that under this analysis a writing could be used as a substitute for
consideration in all situations, including an original gratuitous promise. See, e.g., Patterson, supra
note 9, at 958-60. The Code, however, reflects a policy decision that only in very few situations
can a writing make enforceable a promise unsupported by consideration. See, eg., U.C.C. §§ 1-
107, 2-205. This article is not an apology for the Code's preliminary policy decisions; yet, the
decision to abolish the pre-existing duty rule for modifications of existing contracts is sound be-
cause the parties are already in a bargaining situation at the time of the modification. See, e.g.,
Fuller, supra note 11, at 818-19.
Additionally, it might be argued that if the writing fulfills the cautionary function of a legal
formality, then the Code also should require a memorandum of an unsupported modification
agreement that is part of a contract of sale for a price under $500. Once again, the policy decision
was that of the drafters, but the decision is correct. "Forms must be reserved for relatively impor-
tant transactions." Id. at 805.
82. See, e.g., cases cited note 71 supra.
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Co.,83 for example, the court found that an oral modification agree-
ment changing the time for payment from that set in a written contract
governed by section 2-201 violated section 2-209(3).84 Had the court
interpreted subsection (3) to require merely that the contract as modi-
fied satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the original written contract would
have beea sufficient because section 2-201(1) does not require the pay-
ment term to be accurately stated. The court's requirement that the
modification agreement be written performs the functions of a legal
formality: the writing is evidence of the modification and protects
against false allegation of modification. More importantly, the writing
cautions the potential casual promisor that the unsupported promise
contained in the written modification agreement is legally enforceable.
B. Reliance-Subsections (4) and (5)
There are situations in which a party to an oral modification agree-
ment has reasonably relied on the agreement even in the absence of
consideration or an authenticated memorandum. Reliance, a material
change of position because of an oral modification agreement, provides
a compelling justification for legal enforcement of oral modification
agreements. Reliance, therefore, offers an alternative substantive basis
for enforcement of oral agreements."5
Unlike consideration, reliance affords some evidence of an oral
agreement because the material change in position more likely than not
occurred as a result of the promise to modify.s6 Unlike consideration
or a writing, however, reliance performs neither a channeling nor a
cautionary function. In the absence of a writing, the casual promisor is
not cautioned that the oral agreement has legal effect. Nevertheless,
courts dispense with caution when justice dictates. Justice requires en-
forcement of an oral modification agreement when one party has justi-
fiably, materially, and detrimentally changed his position in reliance on
the agreement.8 7
Subsections (4) and (5) recognize reliance as an alternative yet
subordinate validation device to consideration and a signed written
memorandum. Because these subsections couch reliance in terms of
83. 3 U.C.C. Rep. 293 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
84. Id. at 296.
85. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
86. See generally Comment, The Mechanics of ParolModocalion of Contracts Under the Uni.
form Commercial Code, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 665, 668-76 (1968).
87. See note I 1 sutpra.
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waiver,8 several courts and commentators have wrestled with their
meaning in relation to the writing requirement of subsection (3). Ques-
tions consistently arise concerning what is waived; when it is waived;
who makes the waiver; what the effect of the waiver is; who may retract
the waiver; and what the effect of retraction of the waiver is.8 9
The case of Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank90 best
points out these issues. In that case, Buyer and Seller entered into a
written contract for the sale of shirts and sweaters. One provision of
the contract granted Seller an option to terminate the agreement on or
before April I by sending written notice to Buyer. On March 21, Seller
opened up the sale to other bidders using a sealed bid arrangement.
On March 31, Seller and Buyer orally agreed that Seller would not
exercise its option to terminate the agreement if, on April 1 when the
bids were opened, Buyer was the highest bidder or no other sealed bids
were received. When Buyer attempted to deliver its bid to Seller on
April 1, Seller refused to accept it. Instead, Seller exercised its option
to terminate the agreement, because it had contracted on the evening of
March 31 to sell the goods to a third party, whose bid was substantially
lower than that of Buyer. Buyer sued.
The trial court granted Seller's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that it had timely terminated the written contract. Apparently,
the court reasoned that the oral modification agreement of March 31
between Buyer and Seller was not legally enforceable because it did not
satisfy the writing requirement of section 2-209(3). 9
On appeal, the Third Circuit held erroneous the district court's grant
88. Although waiver is a "troublesome term in the law," it usually is defined as "the volun-
tary and intentional relinquishment of a known right." See 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 16, at
§ 678.
89. For cases dealing with the waiver of a term, see Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Co.,
576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978); Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292 (3rd
Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion); Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 55 F.R.D. 297
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Blue Rock Indus. v. Raymond Int'l, 325 A.2d 66 (Me. 1974).
For cases dealing with waiver of the Statute of Frauds, see Double-E Sportswear Corp. v.
Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1973); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont.
175, 552 P.2d 63 (1976); Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977); Durbano Metals,
Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., 574 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1978). See also Note, The Scope and
Meaning of Waiver in Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 GA. L. RExV. 783 (1971).
90. 488 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1973).
91. The district court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. 55 F.R.D. 297
(E.D. Pa. 1972). After additional proceedings, however, defendant's motion was renewed and
granted by the court without opinion. From this order plaintiff appealed. See 13 U.C.C. Rep.
577, 578 (3rd Cir. 1973).
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of summary judgment for Seller because the case presented genuine
issues of material fact. The majority found that the district court
should have determined whether there was a waiver of the Statute of
Frauds and, if so, whether there was an oral modification of the origi-
nal contract oz a retraction of the waiver. The majority based its deci-
sion on the finding that a waiver under subsection (4) is a waiver of the
Statute of Frauds.92 The concurring judge read the majority holding to
mean that a waiver of subsection (4) is a complete waiver of the Stat-
ute; thus, all other subsequent modifications need not be written.93 The
concurring judge, however, confined the scope of a waiver to waiver of
a substantive term.94 Thus, the majority looked for an oral waiver of
the Statute, but the concurring judge found a waiver of the option term
in the parties' oral agreement to modify.
The choice of the word waiver in subsections (4) and (5) is unfortu-
nate.95 Courts and commentators have expended too much discussion
on the vagaries of waiver when the real issue in section 2-209 cases is
whether an oral modification agreement unsupported by consideration
is legally enforceable. By looking to the underlying purpose and policy
of section 2-209 proposed in this article,96 analysis of the issue is quite
simple. At the outset, an oral agreement unsupported by consideration
is unenforceable. If, however, one of the parties materially changes po-
sition in reliance on the agreement, the agreement is legally enforceable
if it would be unjust to deny its enforcement. 97 Inherent in this phrase-
92. 488 F.2d at 296 n.4.
93. Id. at 298 (Garth, C.J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. I agree wholeheartedly with Professor J. Ewart's thesis that "there is not in law any such
concept as 'waiver,' apart from [election, estoppel, contract and release]." Ewart, Waiver or Elec-
tion, 29 HARV. L. REV. 724, 729 (1916). See also J. EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED AMONo THE
DEPARTMENTS, ELECTION, ESTOPPEL, CONTRACT, RELEASE (1917). Nevertheless, the commen-
tary to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts retains the waiver terminology. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at §§ 88, 89D. In addition, the Code speaks of waiver in at least
one other section in Article 2. See U.C.C. § 2-208(3).
96. The Code is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102(l).
97. This interpretation is similar to the common-law treatment of oral modification agree-
ments, except that at common law the agreement was not enforceable; rather, reliance on the
agreement merely provided an excuse for nonperformance of the contract according to the origi-
nal terms. See text accompanying notes 24-39 supra. On the other hand, this interpretation tracks
the manner in which § 90 of both the Restatement and Restatement (Second) treat reliance on a
gratuitous promise-reliance on the promise makes the promise legally enforceable. I RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 6, at § 90. Section 90(1) provides: "A promise which the promisor should rea-
sonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee ... and which does
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ology is the notion that either party has the right to notify the other that
strict performance of the original contract will be required, and that
notification, if given within a reasonable time of performance, pre-
cludes the other party from relying on the oral modification agree-
ment.98 Analyzing subsections (4) and (5) without using the waiver
terminology also dispenses with the problem presented by comment 2
to section 1-102, which on its face prohibits waiver of the Statute of
Frauds.99
Application of this analysis to Double-E Sportswear points out the
relative ease with which subsections (4) and (5) may be applied to
seemingly difficult cases. The oral modification agreement in Double-E
Sportswear should not be enforceable because the modification was not
supported by consideration and the new contract was for the sale of
goods over $500. If, however, Buyer would have delivered its bid to
Seller on March 31 but did not do so in reliance on their oral agree-
ment modifying the option to terminate, then Buyer's forbearance
would provide the substantive basis for enforcement of an otherwise
unenforceable promise. "° On the other hand, if Buyer did not materi-
ally change its position in reliance on the oral agreement, Seller could
have notified Buyer, within a reasonable time before Seller accepted
the third party's bid, that it was reinstating the original option to termi-
nate according to the original agreement. On remand, the trial court
would need to determine whether, in fact, the parties entered into a
modification agreement and, if so, whether Buyer materially changed
its position in reliance on the agreement before Seller notified Buyer of
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at § 90(1). See also id. § 89D(c).
98. Permitting either party to give notice of strict performance flies in the face of the wording
of subsection (5) added to the 1957 Official Edition of the Code that "[a] party who has made a
waiver ... may retract the waiver." U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1957 ed.). Nevertheless, because neither
party has made an express waiver and because each party has orally agreed to the modification, it
is only just that either party be permitted to thwart reliance.
99. This principle of freedom of contract is subject to specific exceptions found else-
where in the Act and to the general exception stated here. The specific exceptions vary in
explicitness: the statute of frauds found in Section 2-201, for example, does not explicitly
preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies enforce-
ment to such a waiver as part of the "contract" made unenforceable ....
Id. § 1-102, Comment 2.
100. Both subsection (5) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at § 90, make the en-
forcement of the promise dependent on the requirements ofjustice. See notes 1, 97 supra. In this
situation, justice would require enforcement of the unsupported oral promise.
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the original term's reinstatement. If so, then the agreement is legally
enforceable and Seller wrongfully terminated the contract.
C. Enforceability Under Section 2-201(3)
Application of subsections (4) and (5) without reference to waiver
not only more closely follows pre-Code common law' 0' and simplifies
the evidentiary issues surrounding oral modification agreements, but
also closes the "big back door" that commentators feared subsection (4)
had opened on the protection provided by subsections (2) and (3).102
Under the waiver analysis, because an attempt at modification that
does not satisfy subsection (3) can operate as a waiver, the waiver auto-
matically creates a legally enforceable modification. The writing pro-
tection of subsection (3), thus, is pushed out the "big back door"
whenever the parties make an oral modification agreement. By substi-
tuting reliance for the waiver analysis, an oral modification agreement
is unenforceable unless relied upon. The writing requirement of sub-
section (3) controls all situations except those in which there has been a
material change of position in reliance on the oral agreement and
closes the "big back door" on automatic modification. Subsection (4)
opens no bigger back door on subsection (3) than the entire doctrine of
promissory estoppel opens on the law of contracts. °3
Many courts, however, have opened the "big back door" by confus-
ing satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds with enforceability of a con-
tract that does not satisfy the Statute.1°4 As previously discussed, only
a writing satisfies section 2-201.105 Nevertheless, section 2-201(3) per-
mits enforcement of an agreement that does not satisfy the writing re-
quirement of the Statute in cases of special manufacture, admission,
payment and acceptance, or receipt and acceptance. 10 6 Section 2-
209(3) requires that the agreement satisfy the Statute, not that the
101. See text accompanying notes 29-39, 97 supra.
102. 1 N.Y. STUDY, supra note 6, at 644 (analysis of E. Patterson); see also Note, supra note
89.
103. Section 1-103 supplements the Code provisions with the law of estoppel. See note 62
supra.
104. See, e.g., Ampex Corp. v. Appel Media, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (§ 2-
201(3)(c)); Thomas Knutson Shipbuilding Corp. v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 6 U.C.C.
Rep. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (§ 2-201(3)(a), (c)). See also Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc.,
345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963) (issue of applicability of § 2-201(3)(c) not reached).
105. See text accompanying notes 44-45, 49-55 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 46-48, 56-62 supra. Section 2-201(3) is reproduced in note
40 supra.
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agreement be enforceable. Moreover, the enforceability provisions of
section 2-201(3) do not require proof of a legal basis for enforcement of
the oral agreement. Thus, consistent with the basic premise of this arti-
cle that the writing requirement of subsection (3) is an alternative basis
for enforcement of the unsupported agreement, these other circum-
stances should not be used as a mechanism for enforcement of the
modification agreement. 1 7
In Dangeifield v. Markel,' for example, the court decided whether
Buyer's admission in court that the parties had orally agreed to modify
the payment term satisfied section 2-209(3).109 Both parties admitted
the oral modification, but their testimony on the terms of the agreement
differed. The court held that because the admission satisfied the re-
quirements of enforcement of section 2-201(3)(b) the admission barred
Buyer from alleging that the modification did not satisfy the Statute of
Frauds. The terms of the agreement merely presented a factual issue.
This holding would be correct if the case were to be decided solely to
protect the Buyer from false allegations of modification, because the
admission is proof that the parties agreed to a modification. As noted
above, however, there is another purpose for subsection (3). 110 Because
the modification was not supported by consideration, a formal basis for
enforcement of the modification agreement was necessary. The admis-
sion clearly performed the evidentiary function of a legal formality, but
failed to fulfill the cautionary function, because at the time of the
agreement there was nothing to apprise Buyer that his promise would
be legally enforceable. In addition, Buyer's courtroom admission in no
manner indicated that Buyer, at the time of the agreement, manifested
an intent that the modification agreement be legally enforceable.'
107. A written confirmation that complies with § 2-201(2) would satisfy the writing require-
ment of § 2-209(3) even though the writing was not signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought. In this circumstance, the confirmation is a statement by the sender of an intent to rely
on the oral modification agreement. This notification of reliance should be sufficient to warn the
casual promisor that the agreement is legally enforceable. See Fuller, supra note 11, at 811. See
also A & G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976).
108. 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977).
109. Id. at 190.
110. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
111. As a matter of fact, it seems that Buyer in this case agreed to a modification of the pay-
ment term only to continue the contractual relationship of the parties on a friendly basis. Seller
presented no evidence that Buyer had reason to know that the oral agreement might have legal
significance.
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The court, therefore, was incorrect in holding that the Buyer's admis-
sion satisfied the writing requirements of subsection (3).
If, on the other hand, Buyer relied on the oral modification agree-
ment, the court was correct in holding the oral modification legally en-
forceable because fulfillment of the cautionary function of a legal
formality is subordinate to a party's material change of position in reli-
ance on the oral agreement." 2
Assume, for example, that Buyer and Seller enter into a signed writ-
ten contract for the sale on credit of 100 items at $10 per item. Assume
that Seller encounters financial difficulties and orally requests Buyer to
pay cash on delivery of the items and that Buyer orally agrees to the
modification. Because of Buyer's promise to pay C.O.D., Seller does
not seek outside financial assistance. When Seller attempts to deliver
the goods, Buyer refuses to pay and, as a result, Seller refuses to leave
the shipment with Buyer. Buyer sues Seller for breach of contract for
failure to deliver the goods and Seller counterclaims for Buyer's breach
of contract. Assume further that both parties admit the existence of the
oral modification agreement in their pleadings. The issue of whether
Buyer breached the contract depends, therefore, on the enforceability
of the oral modification agreement. Because the agreement was not in
writing, it does not satisfy subsection (3). Moreover, even though the
admission provides evidence of the oral agreement, it provides no sub-
stantive or formal basis for enforcement of the unsupported modifica-
tion. If before delivery, however, Seller can obtain a loan but does not
apply for one in reliance on the oral agreement, Seller's forbearance
constitutes a material change of position in reliance on the oral agree-
ment. According to subsections (4) and (5), therefore, Seller's reliance
dispenses with the requirement that Buyer be cautioned about the legal
significance of the unsupported oral promise. Seller's reliance, not
Seller's admission, provides the substantive basis for enforcement of
the modification." 3
The same analysis applies to situations of special manufacture. As-
sume Buyer and Seller enter into a signed written contract for the sale
of 100 pairs of brown leather gloves at $15 per pair and that Seller later
orally agrees to Buyer's request to deliver orange gloves, which require
special manufacture and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordi-
112. See text accompanying notes 85-103 supra.
113. Moreover, in this situation it would be unjust to deny enforcement of the promise. See
note 100 supra.
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nary course of Seller's business. Seller's substantial beginning of the
manufacture of the orange gloves conforms with the requirements of
enforcement of section 2-201(3)(a), but the modification agreement
does not satisfy the writing requirement of section 2-209(3). Arguably,
the special manufacture provision of section 2-201(3)(a) protects Buyer
against Seller's false allegation of modification because it is evidence of
the modification, but the special manufacture does not caution Buyer,
possibly a casual promisor, that the modification agreement would be
legally enforceable. Nevertheless, the oral modification in this situa-
tion would be enforceable in that Seller materially changed position in
reliance on the oral agreement, and it would be unjust to deny its en-
forcement." 4 According to subsections (4) and (5), Seller's reliance
creates the alternative substantive basis for enforcement of the agree-
ment. Seller's proof that he would not have begun manufacture of the
orange leather gloves but for the oral agreement is sufficient evidence
of Seller's reliance. The suitability of the gloves for sale to others need
not be proved under subsections (4) and (5); it merely would be some
evidence of Seller's reliance on the agreement because a reasonable
manufacturer does not manufacture items, unless specially ordered,
that are not suitable for sale. 5
The same result would follow if the original contract were for orange
gloves and Seller orally agreed to a change to brown gloves, which
were suitable for sale to others. Seller's substantial beginning of manu-
facture of the brown gloves would be the reliance required under sub-
sections (4) and (5), and in this situation it would be unjust to deny
enforcement of the promise." 16 Thus, in situations in which specially
manufactured goods are suitable for sale to others, it would be more
difficult to make a case for enforcement under section 2-201(3)(a) than
it would be to prove reliance under subsections (4) and (5).
Furthermore, in certain situations it would be possible to satisfy sec-
tion 2-201(3)(a), but impossible to prove reliance. Assume, for exam-
ple, that the contract is for the sale of brown gloves in Buyer's unique
design. Seller, unable to procure brown leather, instead manufactures
orange leather gloves, which are not suitable for sale to anyone in the
ordinary course of Seller's business. Seller then telephones Buyer and
114. See id.
115. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 100 supra. At the very least, Seller should be compensated for any incidental
damages incurred in resale of the gloves. U.C.C. § 2-710.
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asks Buyer to agree to a change in color from brown to orange. Buyer
agrees, but before delivery Buyer telephones Seller and insists on deliv-
ery of the original brown gloves. In this instance, the lack of considera-
tion in support of the oral agreement does not make the agreement
unenforceable, 7 but under subsection (3) the agreement must be writ-
ten. Moreover, there is no evidence of a material change of position by
Seller in reliance on the agreement. The oral modification is thus un-
enforceable.
Application of the Dangerfield"8 analysis to this fact pattern, how-
ever, yields a contrary result. Seller completed special manufacture of
the goods, which were not suitable for sale to others, before Buyer noti-
fied Seller of the reinstatement of terms under circumstances reason-
ably indicating that the goods were for Buyer because of their
manufacture in Buyer's unique design. In short, the facts satisfy sec-
tion 2-201(3)(a), but not section 2-209(3). Mere satisfaction of section
2-201(3)(a), therefore, affords no legal basis for enforcement of the
agreement unless the facts indicate a material change of position in
reliance on the agreement.
The final circumstances for enforcement under section 2-201(3), pay-
ment and acceptance of the price or receipt and acceptance of the
goods, presents a similar problem. Assume that Buyer and Seller enter
into a signed written contract for the sale of 100 pairs of brown leather
gloves at $15 per pair to be delivered on June 1, but before June 1
Buyer and Seller agree in good faith to a price change to $16 per pair.
On June 1, Buyer receives and accepts the gloves. Buyer's receipt and
acceptance, which is not specifically referable to the modification
agreement, is neither evidence of the modification nor a cautionary de-
vice indicating to Buyer that the oral modification agreement might be
legally enforceable. This agreement might be enforceable, however, if
Seller can prove a material change of position in reliance on the agree-
ment. If, after Buyer and Seller orally agree to the price change, Seller
orders the gloves from his supplier at a price higher than he had antici-
pated when he entered into the original contract, then under subsec-
tions (4) and (5) Seller's reliance on the agreement would provide a
substantive basis for enforcement of the agreement, notwithstanding
117. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
118. 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977). See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
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the lack of warning to Buyer that the modification is enforceable. 19
If, however, the modification was from brown leather to brown
vinyl, Buyer's receipt and acceptance of the brown vinyl gloves argua-
bly would not be specifically referable to the modification agreement,
but might indicate Buyer's decision to accept the nonconforming goods
and sue for damages. 2 ' Once again, receipt and acceptance fulfills
neither the evidentiary nor cautionary functions of the formality. Even
if the modification were a change in delivery date from June 1 to July
1, receipt and acceptance on July 1, although more probative of the
oral agreement than the other hypothetical changes, would not be spe-
cifically referable to the modification because Buyer merely may have
been exercising his option to accept a nonconforming delivery.
12 1
As the previous situations indicate, the agreement is legally enforcea-
ble under subsections (4) and (5) if either party to the contract can
prove that the parties orally modified the contract and that the party
alleging enforcement of the oral agreement materially changed his po-
sition in reliance on the agreement. The agreement, however, is not
enforceable merely because it satisfies section 2-201(3)(c). That section
does not require evidence to support a finding of either a substantive or
formal basis for enforcement of the agreement. 22
This analysis of section 2-201(3) shows that neither admission of the
agreement by the party against whom enforcement is sought, nor evi-
dence of special manufacture, nor evidence of receipt and acceptance,
cautions parties to an unsupported oral modification that their agree-
ment is legally enforceable. Pursuant to subsections (4) and (5), the
writing requirement should be dispensed with only when a party to the
agreement has materially changed his position in reliance on the agree-
119. Moreover, in this situation, as in the others in this section of the article, it would be unjust
to deny enforcement of the promise. See note 100 supra.
120. See U.C.C. §§ 2-601(b), 714(1).
121. See id.
122. It can be argued that the agreement should be legally enforceable if either party can
prove the modification agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. This argument, however,
fails to take into account the importance of cautioning the casual promisor that his promise, which
is unsupported by consideration, is legally enforceable when the promise is part of an agreement
modifying an existing contract. Of course, a compelling argument could be made in rebuttal that
if Buyer orally agreed to the modification, then acceptance of the goods would caution a reason-
able person in Buyer's position that the modification agreement was legally enforceable. This
supposition of caution, however, does not take into account the realities of modem business.
Buyer's acceptance, for example, may be made by an agent unaware of Buyer's oral agreement, or
Buyer may not remember the oral agreement at the time of acceptance.
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ment and justice requires enforcement of the agreement. Because sec-
tion 2-201(3) does not require proof of reliance, the occurrence of any
of the circumstances in section 2-201(3), without more, does not satisfy
the writing requirement of subsection (3).123
VI. MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS UNDER SECTION 2-
209(3)--AGREEMENTS SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION
As previously stated, the basic premise of this article is that the writ-
ing requirement of subsection (3) does not apply to oral modification
agreements that are supported by consideration. 2 Assume that Buyer
and Seller enter into a signed written contract in which Buyer agrees to
buy 100 items on credit at $10 per item and Seller agrees to deliver the
100 items on June 1. The original contract thus comes within and satis-
fies section 2-201(1). On May 1 Buyer and Seller orally agree to a mod-
ification by which Seller promises to deliver the goods on May 15 in
exchange for Buyer's promise to pay cash on delivery for the goods.
At first blush, the agreement seems to fall within the requirements of
subsection (3) because the new contract is within the Statute of Frauds.
The modification agreement, however, need not be shown by an au-
thenticated memorandum because application of subsection (3) to this
situation is unnecessary and, more importantly, contrary to the under-
lying purpose and policy of section 2-209.125 The agreement is sup-
ported by consideration, which provides a substantive basis for
enforcement of the agreement, and thus requires no further legal basis
for enforcement. Moreover, the original writing satisfies the writing re-
quirement of the Statute of Frauds because the memorandum need not
be accurate. 126
Although the drafters intended subsection (3) to protect against false
allegations of oral modifications, 1 27 this protection is unnecessary when
the modification is supported by consideration. Very rarely would a
party to a contract "conjure up"'12 a modification that imposes an ad-
ditional duty on himself as well as on the other party to the contract. If
123. If subsection (3) were amended as proposed in this article, see text accompanying notes
148-51 infra, unsupported oral promises made by a merchant would be legally enforceable with-
out proof of a writing or reliance.
124. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
125. See text accompanying note 2 supra; note 96 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
127. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
128. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 3. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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such conjuring does occur, the party alleging the modification would
need to prove the modification by a preponderance of the evidence.
Proving the modification would be difficult if the original writing con-
tained the original term. Even if the modification is proved, the other
party can raise a defense that the agreement does not meet the test of
good faith129 or that it is unconscionable. 130 Thus, consideration pro-
vides most of the necessary protection against false allegations of modi-
fications. If subsection (3) is interpreted to require that every
modification agreement supported by consideration satisfy the Statute
of Frauds, section 2-209 clearly adds an unnecessary technicality to
modification of sales contracts that did not exist at common law.13 1
The only modification that always must be written to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Statute is a change in quantity. In the hypothetical,
assume that instead of changing the date and payment terms, Buyer
and Seller orally agree to an increase in quantity from 100 to 200 items.
This modification must satisfy section 2-201 because the new contract is
not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods shown in the original
writing.' 32
In conclusion, section 2-209(3) does not apply to modification agree-
ments that are supported by consideration because consideration sup-
plies the substantive basis for their enforcement. The formality of a
writing provides no further protection. Unless the agreement modifies
the quantity, it need not be written because the original writing satisfies
the Statute of Frauds.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT OF SUBSECTION (3)-
MERCHANTS AND NONMERCHANTS
To this point, the article has made no distinction between situations
129. See note 6 supra. See also Ruble Forest Prods., Inc. v. Lancer Mobile Homes, Inc., 269
Or. 315, 524 P.2d 1204 (1974).
130. See note 6 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 15-28 supra. In S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., -
Mich. App. -, 286 N.W.2d 34 (1979), the court did not apply section 2-209 to a modification
supported by consideration. Contrary to the argument in this article, however, the court seemed
to have determined that section 2-201 applies to all modification-not just quantity modifica-
tion---of contracts within the Statute. Id. at -, 286 N.W.2d at 39 n.l.
132. See text accompanying notes 49-53 upra. In this situation, satisfaction of any provision
of § 2-201 would allow for enforcement of the new contract because the writing requirement stems
from § 2-201(1) (the Statute of Frauds), not from § 2-209(3).
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in which the promisor is a merchant and a nonmerchant 33 No such
distinction is made in subsections (3), (4), and (5),134 and any attempt to
distinguish between different classes of promisors within the present
framework of section 2-209 would be artificial.
The policy and purpose of section 2-209131 and the fast pace of com-
mercial transactions, however, justify a substantive amendment that
would eliminate the writing requirement of subsection (3) for merchant
promisors. Section 2-209 differs from contract law in that a promise
modifying an existing contract needs no consideration to be binding.
Nevertheless, section 2-209 follows contract law to the extent that a
promise modifying an important contract needs some legal basis for
enforcement; subsection (3) requires a formal basis for enforcement in
place of consideration, and subsections (4) and (5) permit reliance as an
alternative substantive basis for enforcement.1 36 These bases, however,
are unnecessary when the promisor is a merchant.
For purposes of illustration, assume that Buyer and Seller enter into
a signed written contract for the sale of 100 pairs of leather gloves at
$10 per pair. Before Seller takes steps to obtain the gloves, Seller and
Buyer orally agree to a price change to $12 per pair. Pursuant to sub-
section (3), this oral modification agreement is not enforceable. One
ramification of this result is that Buyer can change his mind about the
price change and insist on the gloves at $10 per pair. Consequently, if
damages were assessed for a breach one minute after the parties made
the oral agreement, Buyer would receive a windfall. If Seller breaches
the contract, he would pay damages based upon the lower contract
price, which would enhance the amount Buyer would receive.1 37 If
133. Section 2-104(1) defines "merchant."
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1). For a thorough discussion of merchants under Article 2, see Dolan, The
Merchant Class of Article 2: Farmers, Doctors, and Others, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
134. Subsection (2) of § 2-209, which is reproduced in note I supra, distinguishes the protec-
tions afforded merchants from those available to nonmerchants under Article 2.
135. See text accompanying note 2 supra; note 96 supra.
136. See text following note 13 supra.
137. In this situation, Buyer's damages equal the difference between the market price at the
time of breach and the contract price. U.C.C. § 2-713(1). If the market price is greater than $10,
Buyer will receive a larger award if the contract price is $10 rather than $12. Under either con-
tract price, Buyer will be awarded no damages if the market price is less than $10.
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Buyer breaches, Seller's damages would be lower because of the $10
contract price.138 The question of who should receive the windfall in
these situations is relatively unimportant; likewise, the attribution of
the windfall to the party wishing to change his mind is arbitrary. The
rule just as easily could have presented the windfall to the party wish-
ing to enforce the oral agreement.
A. Of Merchants
Although attribution of the windfall is relatively unimportant, there
are two reasons for giving effect to oral modification promises made by
merchants. First, this kind of promise frequently is made in commer-
cial transactions.' 39 More importantly, to deny legal enforcement of
the promise is economically wasteful.
In the hypothetical, Seller was in no better position after than before
Buyer orally agreed to the price change because Buyer did not sign a
written promise. Seller, in fact, put himself in a worse position because
the only evidence of a legal basis for enforcement of the agreement that
Seller possibly could adduce is evidence of Seller's material change of
position in reliance on the oral agreement. Assume that Seller ordered
the leather to make the gloves or that Seller already manufactured the
gloves. Seller could have cancelled the order or sold the gloves to an-
other buyer and sued Buyer for damages. But what is the contract
price? At what point does the oral promise become legally enforcea-
ble? Because of his dependence on proof of reliance, Seller never can
be certain of the terms of the sales contract. Moreover, producing evi-
dence of reliance is much more costly to the parties than merely pro-
ducing evidence of the oral agreement." In addition, requiring a
judicial determination of whether reliance is present and whether jus-
tice requires enforcement of the promise is judicially and administra-
138. In this situation, Seller's damages equal the difference between the market price at the
time for tender and the contract price. Id. § 2-708(l). If the market price is less than $10, Seller
will receive less in damages under the $10 contract price than under the $12 price.
139. See, e.g., Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Co., 576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978); Double-
E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1973); Farmers Elevator Co. v.
Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 552 P.2d 63 (1976); Thomas Knutson Shipbuilding Corp. v. George W.
Rogers Constr. Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Ruble Forest Prods., Inc. v. Lancer
Mobile Homes, Inc., 269 Or. 315, 524 P.2d 1204 (1974); Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting
Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 293 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
140. Instances of reliance also may be evidence of the agreement's existence, but presentation
of this evidence to prove the agreement is within the discretion of the parties. See text accompa-
nying note 115 supra.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
312 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tively more expensive than merely requiring a determination of
whether an oral agreement exists.
This proposal, which gives legal effect to oral modification agree-
ments not supported by consideration or reliance, creates a new legal
basis for the enforcement of a promise. This basis, merely statutory,
fits into none of Professor Fuller's categories.1 4 1 As with unsupported
oral modifications of contracts for the sale of goods for less than
$500,142 the mere making of the promise provides the legal basis for its
enforcement. This basis, however, comports with present fast moving
commercial transactions.
Of course, if subsection (3) were amended, the casual promisor
would not be cautioned of the legal significance of his promise. This
problem can be solved with education of merchants, who gradually will
become aware that all promises made as part of an existing bargain are
enforceable. Casual merchant promisors, moreover, will not be left
without recourse. Section 2-209(1) grants enforcement only to those
modification agreements which are made in good faith; 143 unconscion-
able agreements, in addition, remain subject to the provisions of section
2-302.144
B. Of Nonmerchants
Because nonmerchants are the very people who need the writing pro-
tection of subsection (3), this article does not propose that unsupported
oral promises made by nonmerchants be given legal effect. Assume
that Buyer and Seller in the hypothetical are nonmerchants. Seller in-
herits 100 pairs of gloves and contracts to sell them to Buyer at $10 per
pair. Because Seller later anticipates greater delivery costs, Seller and
Buyer orally agree to a price change to $12 per pair.
What is the price of the gloves? Under subsection (3) the answer is
$10 because the reasonable expectation of a nonmerchant is that an
unsupported promise is not legally enforceable. 145 The nonmerchant is
141. See note 11 supra.
142. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 6 supra. "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-
103(l)(b).
144. See note 6 supra.
145. Although I have no empirical evidence to support this proposition, one need only look to
the kinds of promises that courts usually enforce to determine what the reasonable expectation of
a nonmerchant would be. Of course, nonmerchants usually do not speak or think in terms of
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not cautioned that his promise may have legal significance; only the act
of signing the promise provides this caution.146
C. Between Merchants and Nonmerchants
The proposed amendment creates some problems in situations in
which only one party to the contract is a merchant. Assume that Buyer,
a nonmerchant, orally agrees to a price change proposed by Seller, a
merchant. Although Buyer agrees to the price change, Seller is in the
same position he would be if subsection (3) were not amended. Seller
must show reliance to create a legally enforceable promise from an un-
enforceable one. Because Buyer can change his mind any time before
reliance, it will be difficult for Seller to plan for further performance of
the contract. Although the unenforceability of Buyer's promise creates
some commercial problems for Seller, resolution of these problems
should favor the nonmerchant promisor who expects that his unsup-
ported promise will not be legally enforceable. In addition, Seller al-
ways can protect his expectation by having Buyer sign a written
agreement.
A more serious inequity may arise when a merchant makes an un-
supported oral promise to a nonmerchant. Assume that Buyer is a
merchant and Seller is a nonmerchant. According to the proposal, the
merchant Buyer's unsupported oral promise will be legally enforceable
and Buyer will not be permitted to change his mind concerning the
price change unless Seller agrees. Buyer, in this situation, will argue
that because Seller does not expect the unsupported oral agreement to
be legally enforceable, Buyer should have the same right to change his
mind as a nonmerchant. Buyer's argument is palpable, but the
merchant Buyer should expect his promise to be enforceable. This pro-
posal cautions him that his promise to the nonmerchant Seller will be
enforceable. Moreover, making the Buyer's promise legally enforcea-
ble is consistent with the section 2-209 policy of protecting non-
merchants. 147
"consideration" or "unsupported" promises, but it is reasonable to assume that almost all lay
persons know that gift promises and social promises are not enforceable. Baby, for example,
cannot sue Grandma for not giving him a new bicycle on his sixth birthday; John cannot recover
damages from Mary for breaking a date with him.
146. See note I supra. It is also reasonable to assume that a writing would impress a non-
merchant more than consideration because nonmerchants forever are trying to "get it in writing."
147. Subsection (2) makes it difficult for a merchant to foist a "no oral modification clause" on
a nonmerchant. If the merchant supplies the original written contract, the nonmerchant must
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D. Conclusion
By giving legal effect to unsupported oral promises made by
merchants, the proposed amendment to subsection (3) would free pres-
ent fast moving commercial transactions from the technical constraints
of the common law of contracts and section 2-209(3) as it presently
exists. In addition, merely requiring the party asserting the oral agree-
ment to prove its existence would streamline and make less costly con-
troversies surrounding unsupported oral modification agreements.
VII. THE FUTURE OF SUBSECTION (3)
The purpose of section 2-209 is to "make effective all necessary and
desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the techni-
calities which [prior to enactment of the Code] hamper[ed] such adjust-
ments." '48 Subsection (1) accomplishes much of this goal by abolishing
the pre-existing duty rule. Subsection (3), on the other hand, adds to
the modification process a writing technicality that did not exist at com-
mon law.149 By requiring an authenticated memorandum to enforce
every unsupported modification creating a new contract that comes
within the Statute of Frauds, subsection (3) impedes the effectiveness of
many necessary and desirable oral modification agreements.
At this time, the writing requirement may be necessary to caution a
casual promisor that an unsupported modification agreement is legally
enforceable. This caution, however, should not be afforded to a
merchant promisor,150 and subsection (3) should be modified accord-
ingly. Total repeal of subsection (3) should occur when the caution of
the written formality is not needed by nonmerchants. At that time,
nonmerchants will have become sufficiently aware that unsupported
oral promises made in a bargaining context will be legally enforced.
When subsection (3) finally is repealed, modifications of contracts gov-
ered by the Statute of Frauds need satisfy only section 2-2011, 51
separately sign the clause for it to be enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2-209(2). Contra, Trust Co. of
Georgia v. Montgomery, 136 Ga. App. 742, 222 S.E.2d 196 (1975); Note, Oral Modpicatlon of
Sales Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 601 (1972).
148. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 1.
149. There was, however, a common-law requirement that modifications of essential terms be
written. See text accompanying notes 15-28 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 139-44; text following note 146 supra.
151. At least one court already has ignored subsection (3) by looking only to the requirements
of the Code's Statute of Frauds; but that court misinterpreted § 2-201 to prohibit all oral modifica-
tions of contracts within the Statute. See Edelstein v. Carole House Apts., Inc., 220 Pa. Super.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2-209
§ 2-209. Modification Not Supported by Consideration'5 2
(1) A good faith agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded,
but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form sup-
plied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party. 153
(3) A modification agreement:
(a) which is not supported by consideration; and
(b) which creates a new contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more; and
f(c) in which the promisor is a nonmerchant] 154
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is a writing
sufficient to indicate that the agreement has been made by the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his
authorized agent or broker.
(4) Although an attempt at modification does not satisfy the re-
quirements of subsection (2) or (3), it is enforceable by way of action or
defense if either party to the agreement has made a justifiable material
change of position in reliance on the oral agreement and it would be
unjust to deny its enforcement.
298, 286 A.2d 658 (1971). The Restatement (Second) also can be interpreted to follow this ap-
proach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at §§ 89D, 223; see note 13 supra.
152. The title is changed to reflect my agreement with Professor Ewart that waiver does not
exist in contract law. See note 95 supra. In addition, rescission is an unnecessary term because it
need not be supported by consideration or satisfy the Statute of Frauds. See text accompanying
note 22 supra.
153. Amendment of subsection (2) is left for another day.
154. Inclusion of this clause would amend the substance of § 2-209 as it now exists. See text
accompanying notes 133-47 supra. When the caution of a written formality is no longer needed
by nonmerchants, this subsection shall be repealed. See text accompanying notes 148-51 supra.
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